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jurisdiction and the costs of abstention. 8 The American Law Insti-
tute, in an effort to rectify this situation, has advocated codification
of the abstention doctrine so as to minimize the present confusion as
to the proper application of these judge-made rules." However, until
these proposals have the force of law, federal courts must continue
to decide as best they can on a case-by-case basis' whether there
exist the "special circumstances" which warrant the exercise of their
discretionary power to abstain.''
RICHARD FRANK BIRIBAUER
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR-CRIMES EVI-
DENCE IN PROSECUTIONS FOR CHILD ABUSE
Prosecutions for child abuse may often fall short of conviction
because the nature of the crime tends to limit the availability of
reliable evidence. Abuse is often perpetrated upon children too young
either to testify against the abuser or to exert enough resistance to
"Professor Wright, a proponent of, and contributor to, the American Law Insti-
tute's proposals on federal court jurisdiction, has pointed out the results of this confu-
sion:
[Tihe Supreme Court since 1940 has developed a variety of rules,
generally known as the "abstention doctrines," that recognize various
circumstances in which a federal court, though it has jurisdiction,
ought to defer to the state courts and let the state courts answer some
or all of the questions the case poses. The circumstances in which
these doctrines are applicable are not clearly defined. In the last three
years there are at least 94 reported opinions of the lower courts in
which they have struggled to apply the doctrines and have reached
wildly inconsistent results.
Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Proposals, 26
WASH. & LEE L. Rlv. 185, 202 (1969).
"AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICbON BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1371 and Commentary at 282 (1969) (Official Draft). It is
interesting to note that the ALI proposals would not have permitted federal jurisdic-
tion in the instant case. Id. § 1302(b). See generally Field, Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: A Summary of American Law Institute Proposals, 46 F.R.D. 141, 152-53
(1969); Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute
Proposals, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 185, 202 (1969).
"'Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 & n.11 (1964); NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S.
471 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). See also Grisson
v. Roanoke County, 348 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1972).
"'Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949).
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leave indicatons of a struggle.' And, since abuse usually occurs within
a household, there are frequently no impartial witnesses to its com-
mission.! Further, doctors and school officials may be reluctant to
involve themselves in domestic problems by reporting suspicious cir-
cumstances.3 In the absence of other sources of evidence, the prosecu-
tor's only recourse may be to the testimony of the defendant himself.
However, even if the defendant is willing to take the stand, his testi-
mony cannot be expected to advance the prosecution's case. Thus the
unavailability of evidence may frustrate the prosecution and punish-
ment of child abusers.
A recent decision by the Fourth Circuit involved many of the
problems ordinarily facing prosecutors in child abuse cases. In United
States v. Woods,4 a mother was appealing a conviction for the murder
of her seven-month-old son, Paul Woods, who died of suffocation. The
only eye-witness to the events leading to the child's death had been
the defendant who testified that on five occasions prior to the child's
death he had gasped for breath and turned blue for no apparent
cause. While an autopsy did not establish any natural cause for the
child's respiratory difficulties, neither were there any marks on the
child's body to indicate maltreatment. One doctor testified that he
was "75% certain" that the child's death had been a "homicide
caused by smothering,"5 but he conceded that the death could have
been natural. No other direct evidence' of murder was presented at
'United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 133 (4th Cir. 1973).
2Brown, Fox & Hubbard, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Battered Child
Syndrome, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 45, 69 (1973); Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part
I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REv. 293, 333
(1972).
'Note 2 supra.
'484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973). The crime charged occurred at Aberdeen Proving
Grounds, Maryland, a federal reservation, and the defendant was tried for first degree
murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970), which provides in relevant part:
(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or
any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premediated kill-
ing . . . is murder in the first degree.
1484 F.2d at 130.
'See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185, at 435 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICKI:
The characterization of evidence as "direct" or "circumstantial"
points to the kind of inference which is sought to be drawn from the
evidence to the truth of the proposition for which it is offered. If a
witness testifies that he saw A stab B with a knife, and this testimony
is offered to prove the stabbing, the inference sought is merely from
the fact that the witness made the statement, and the assumption
that witnesses are worthy of belief, to the truth of the asserted fact.
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the trial. However, the prosecution remedied this deficiency by intro-
ducing other evidence which showed that before Paul's death eight
other children in the defendant's custody had suffered the same
symptoms, and that six of them had died. 7 The defendant had never
This is direct evidence. When, however, the evidence is offered also
for some further proposition based upon some inference other than
merely the inference from assertion to the truth of the fact asserted,
then the evidence is circumstantial evidence of this further fact-to-be-
inferred.
(footnotes omitted).
"The following summary of the evidence has been garnered from the majority's
opinion, 484 F.2d at 129-32, and Brief for Appellant at 5-29, Brief for Appellee at 6-
34, United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973):
(a) Charles Stewart, Mrs. Woods' first natural child, was born prematurely in
1946 and lived for little over a month. He experienced brief episodes of breathing
problems and cyanosis (a blue discoloration of the skin, especially around the lips, due
to a lack of oxygen) while in the defendant's care, and died soon thereafter. The death
certificate listed the cause of death as "enlarged thymus" and "static lymphaticus,"
but the prosecution's expert medical witness, Dr. DiMaio (the forensic pathologist),
disbelieved that diagnosis and testified that Charles' breathing problems were sympto-
matic of either smothering or malnutrition (Charles had been refusing to eat properly
and had suffered vomiting and diarrhea). He also testified that the child could have
suffered a "crib death"-the sudden, unexplained natural death of an infant. There
was conflicting evidence as to whether Mrs. Woods was with the child when he suffered
his fatal incident of breathing difficulty.
(b) John Wise, the defendant's nephew, was born in 1943 and died in 1946. An
autopsy revealed indications consistent with diptheria; Dr. DiMaio testified that the
autopsy was incomplete, but that on the basis of what had been done he agreed with
the diagnosis. Two other children from the same household were hospitalized with
diptheria two days after John's death. While Mrs. Woods was in the Wises' home when
John died, there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether she was in bed with the
child at the time of his death.
(c) Mary Huston was Mrs. Woods' second natural child and first daughter. She
was born prematurely in 1950 and lived for just under two months, during which time
she experienced four or five episodes of cyanosis. Cause of death was listed in the death
certificate as asphyxia due to a mucus plug and patent foramen ovale, a congenital
heart defect involving an opening between the two sides of the heart. Dr. DiMaio
refused to accept either diagnosis as the cause of death, but he did not offer his own
opinion as to her cause of death and he agreed that she could have died of natural
causes.
(d) Carol Huston, the defendant's third natural child, was also born prematurely
and died four months later, in 1952. The post mortem diagnosis of epiglottitis and
bronchopneumonia as causes of death, made by the attending physician, was dis-
counted by Dr. DiMaio, because without an autopsy neither could accurately be diag-
nosed after death. No autopsy had been performed. However, Dr. DiMaio offered no
opinion on the cause of Carol's death different from that of Carol's own doctor, and
he agreed that Carol could have died naturally.
(e) Lillie Stewart, Mrs. Woods' niece, died in 1958 at the age of fourteen months.
There had been fear that Lillie was about to contract pneumonia, and she had been
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been convicted, indicted or even accused of child abuse prior to this
indictment, and she appealed her conviction for first-degree murder
on the ground that the evidence concerning the eight other children
should not have been admitted by the trial court.'
In a split decision, the Fourth Circuit upheld both the admission
of the evidence and the conviction. The majority was concerned that,
moved from the apartment of her parents to the Woods' apartment, which was consid-
ered warmer. Mr. Stewart, Lillie's father and the brother of the defendant, testified
that he was spending the night in the Woods' apartment when he awoke to find Mrs.
Woods holding the child, who was suffering breathing difficulties (from which she did
not recover). The cause of death was certified as fulminating pneumonia with a second-
ary cause of bronchiolitis. Dr. DiMaio testified that Lillie could have died of natural
causes.
(f) Marlan Rash, who died in 1964 at the age of eighteen months, was the son of
a friend. Testimony showed that Marlan had suffered three cyanotic episodes and that
Mrs. Woods had been present during each of them; however, there was conflicting
testimony about whether she had been with the child at the time each of the incidents
began. The child died on the same day that he was released from a hospital, where he
had been admitted following the second incident. An autopsy failed to reveal a cause
of death; Dr. DiMaio testified that he thought that the death was consistent with death
by smothering, but he agreed that Marlan could have died naturally.
(g) Eddie Thomas, eighteen months, and his older brother were left in the care
of Mrs. Woods for a day in 1967. While the children were alone with Mrs. Woods, Eddie
experienced breathing problems and began to turn blue, due, according to Mrs. Woods,
to a mucus plug in his throat. She testified that she removed the obstruction and gave
the child mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on the way to the hospital. At the hospital
Eddie appeared well and was released. Eddie had had one similar instance of choking
and turning blue in the past, according to his mother's testimony. Dr. DiMaio refused,
as he had done with the diagnosis of Mary Huston, to accept mucus as a reason for an
otherwise normal child to choke, turn blue and require artificial resuscitation.
(h) Judy Woods, born and adopted by the Woods in 1967, had at least six epi-
sodes of breathing difficulty and cyanosis. The two times she was hospitalized follow-
ing such incidents she showed no difficulties at all. Dr. DiMaio testified that her
medical history did not reveal any cause for Judy's cyanosis, and felt that her symp-
toms were consistent with smothering. At the close of the government's case against
Mrs. Woods, the trial court granted a judgment of acquittal on charges against Mrs.
Woods which had been based on Judy's most recent cyanotic episode. Since her re-
moval from Mrs. Woods' custody after that last episode, Judy suffered no cyanosis.
(i) Paul Woods, for whose death the defendant was convicted, was seven months
old and apparently exclusively in Mrs. Woods' care when he began to suffer instances
of gasping for breath and of cyanosis. Four different times he responded to resuscita-
tion, but the fifth time he became comatose, and he died a month later. No reason for
his cyanosis or respiratory difficulties was ever discovered. Dr. DiMaio declared that
he was "75% certain" that Paul's death was a homicide by smothering. There was a
25% possibility that Paul had died naturally from a disease currently unknown, and
he agreed that this constituted a reasonable doubt about the cause of death.
'Two other grounds for appeal which will not be discussed were: the jury had been
improperly instructed on how to consider the evidence of prior offenses, and the defen-
dant had been improperly sentenced. See 484 F.2d at 129.
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"[aibsent the fortuitous presence of an eyewitness, infanticide or
child abuse by suffocation would go largely unpunished."' In response
to that concern and in order to affirm the challenged admission, the
majority apparently expanded the rules on the admissibility of prior-
crimes evidence. In contrast Judge Widener's dissent focused on the
interests of fairness to the defendant, and emphasized that the best
means to ensure a just adjudication of the criminal charge lay in a
close adherence to the traditional rules of evidence. Neither the ma-
jority opinion nor the dissent is free from criticism. The majority's
apparent expansion of the rules -of admissibility may have sacrified
some of the evidentiary safeguards intended to ensure a fair trail. On
the other hand, the dissent seems to have construed those safeguards
so narrowly as to restrict unreasonably the effectiveness of prosecu-
tions for child abuse.
In order to understand how the opinions in Woods departed from
the traditional rules of evidence, it is necessary to recognize the dis-
trust with which courts have viewed evidence of a defendant's pre-
vious criminal activities.'0 Evidence of other crimes tends strongly to
prove the defendant's "bad character"-i.e., his propensity to com-
mit either crimes in general or the particular kind of crime for which
he is on trial." If the evidence is offered only to show the defendant's
bad character, it is normally excluded from the jury's consideration
due to judicial fear that such evidence would arouse undue prejudice
against the defendant.' 2
In evidentiary terms, prejudice refers to the tendency of jurors to
'484 F.2d at 133.
"°See Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70
YA, L.J. 763 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Other Crimes Evidence]. The evidence in
Woods was of prior, unproved crimes.
"MCCORMICK § 190, at 447.
"See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948):
The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, spe-
cific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such
facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable
perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character
is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the
jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad gen-
eral record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a partic-
ular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite
its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disal-
lowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and
undue prejudice.
(footnotes omitted). See also MCCORMICK §§ 186-190. Confusion of the issues and
unfair surprise were not significant possibilities in Woods, and will not be discussed.
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decide an issue on an improper basis, usually an emotional one.' 3 For
example, a jury might convict a person not because it is convinced
of his guilt of the crime charged, but because it is moved by the
revelation of his past criminal record to believe that he is a "bad
person" who simply deserves to be incarcerated, or that he ought to
be imprisoned for his prior, unpunished crimes." Such reasoning may
have the improper effect of convicting a person for a crime of which
he is not specifically accused at trial. 5
Because of the danger of prejudice from other-crimes evidence,
courts generally allow such evidence to be introduced only if it will
be used for some purpose other than to show the defendant's previous
record and bad character. Although prior-crimes evidence will estab-
lish the defendant's criminal past and therefore his "criminal na-
ture," regardless of the purpose for which the evidence is intro-
duced, 11 it is thought that if such evidence is sufficiently relevant to
some other purpose, its admission may be justified. For example, a
defendant's prior criminal acts may be introduced as evidence if used
to establish his intent for committing the crime or to show that the
crime was part of a larger scheme or plan.7 "Intent," "larger plan"
and several additional purposes have so often and so long been relied
upon as grounds for the admissibility of prior-crimes evidence that
some courts have taken the position that those purposes are the only
grounds of admissibility. s Under such a view, evidence of prior
crimes is inadmissible, unless used for one of the widely recognized
purposes. These purposes are sometimes referred to as "exceptions"
to the presumed rule which excludes all prior-crimes evidence." This
approach is erroneous, however, because the "exceptions" were not
originally intended to be the exclusive grounds of admissibility7 but
only examples of purposes, other than establishing the defendant's
"PRoP. FED. R. EvID. 4-03, Advisory Committee's Note at 54 (Prelim. draft, 1969).
"Other Crimes Evidence, supra note 10, at 763-64. In Woods, the evidence which
implied that the defendant had murdered seven helpless children and had just missed
killing two more could be expected to have aroused in the minds of the jurors either
or both of those prejudicial tendencies.
"Other Crimes Evidence, supra note 10, at 763-64.
"United States v. Baldivid, 465 F.2d 1277, 1283 (4th Cir. 1972) (Sobeloff, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'7McCORMICK § 190, at 448-51. The other well-established purposes listed include:
"res gestae," handiwork or signature, propensity for illicit sexual relations, no-
accident, motive, malice, intent, identity, intent to avoid punishment, and impeach-
ment of the testimony of the accused.
"See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV.
L. REv. 988 (1938).
"Id.
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bad character, for which prior-crimes evidence may be introduced. 20
Properly stated, the rule is that all prior-crimes evidence is admissi-
ble if relevant to some purpose other than showing the defendant's
bad character. 2' The number of such other purposes is potentially
limitless, since "the range of relevancy outside the ban [of character
evidence] is almost infinite . *... ,,2
Nevertheless, the dangers inherent in evidence of prior crimes are
not mitigated by the fact that the evidence is relevant to something
other than the defendant's bad character, for the possibility remains
that the jury will be prejudiced against a defendant by the revelation
of his past criminal behavior.- Therefore, a court faced with a request
to admit such evidence must look beyond the relevancy 2 of the evi-
dence to the continuing problem of prejudice and weigh the likelihood
of prejudice against the considerations which favor admissibility. If,
after this process of weighing or "balancing," a court finds that the
prejudicial effect of the evidence is outweighed by its "probative
"Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARv. L.
REv. 954, 966 (1933).
"McCoRMICK § 190, at 447. The rule is based on the basic two axioms which
govern the admissibility of all evidence: first, only evidence which is logically probative
of or relevant to something required to be proved in a case is admissible; second, all
evidence which is logically probative should be admitted unless there is some clear
policy calling for its exclusion. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
AT THE COMMON LAW 264 (1898). See also McCORMICK § 184, at 433; I WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 9 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMOREI; James, Relevancy, Prob-
ability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941). Normally, bad character is neither
required nor even permitted to be proved, and evidence relevant only to that issue is
not admissible.
However, there is one common exception to the rule against the admission of
character evidence. Many jurisdictions permit the use of evidence of a defendant's
prior sex offenses to show the defendant's propensity to commit such crimes. This
permissible proof of bad character is discussed below in the text. Because of the
admittedly high risk of prejudice when such proof is attempted, courts often limit the
evidence to that of the defendant's crimes against the particular victim. See
MCCORMICK § 190, at 449-50.
22McCoRMICK § 190, at 448. It should be emphasized that the "other purpose"
must itself raise an issue required to be proved in the case. An example to the contrary
would be the use of prior-crimes evidence to prove the defendant's intent in a trial for
manslaughter. Intent is not a necessary ingredient of the crime of manslaughter, and
is therefore not required to be proved. Prior-crimes evidence should therefore not be
admissible for that purpose. See note 21 supra.
2See note 16 supra.
2'As used herein, the term "relevancy" refers to the logically probative nature of
the evidence. See note 21 supra. Logical relevancy should not be confused with "legal
relevancy," which is a term of art referring to a presumed standard of admissibility.
For a discussion and comparison of both logical and "legal" relevancy, see James,
supra note 21.
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value, ' '2 "1 then it should admit the evidence. Probative value, in re-
spect to prior-crimes evidence, has been defined by the Fourth Cir-
cuit in terms of three factors: the conclusiveness of the prior-crimes
evidence insofar as it tends to show that the defendant in fact com-
mitted the alleged prior acts;2 the prosecution's need for the evidence
in light of the availability of other evidence; and the strength of the
evidence in supporting the proposition which it is intended to prove.
Each of these factors should be separately compared with the ex-
pected prejudicial effect of the evidence and if any one of them is
outweighed by the potential prejudice, the court should exclude the
evidence.2 This balancing test is intended to favor exclusion rather
than admission of the evidence, because the overriding concern is to
protect the defendant from a conviction based on prejudice. 29 There-
fore, the trial court's discretion should run in favor of the defendant
and against the admission of prior-crimes evidence.
3 0
Thus, the process of admitting prior-crimes evidence involves first
the identification of an "exception ' 3 ' and then the application of the
balancing test. In Woods the majority found that the offered evidence
fit within the no-accident and signature "exceptions. '32 In applying
25MCCORMICK § 190, at 447.
2 Some jurisdictions have held that it is solely the function of the jury to decide
whether the evidence of prior crimes is conclusive enough of the defendant's guilt to
warrant consideration of that evidence as proof of his guilt of the crime at trial. See
Lankford v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. 442, 248 S.W. 389 (1923). It seems better for the court
to make a preliminary determination of the conclusiveness of such evidence, thereby
further protecting the defendant from prejudice.
"United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Samuel,
431 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946 (1971). See also
MCCORMICK § 190, at 453.
"Were the conclusiveness of the evidence, the prosecution's need for it and the
strength of its support for the issues "added together" before being compared to the
prejudicial effect, the outcome might favor the admission of evidence which was wholly
inconclusive of the defendant's past guilt but which was greatly needed by the prosecu-
tion. Such an admission would clearly undermine the interests of protecting the defen-
dant from prejudice. Judge Widener noted this in his dissent. 484 F.2d at 141 n.5. See
also Other Crimes Evidence, supra note 10.
"'MCCORMICK § 190, at 453-54.
u'Id.
""Exception" is a convenient term of art and will be used to refer to the purposes
other than showing bad character for which prior-crimes evidence may be used. How-
ever, it is to be remembered that the only true exception to the rules governing the
admissiblity of prior-crimes evidence is the sex-crime eception. See note 21 supra.
11484 F.2d at 134. The no-accident "exception" permits the use of prior-crimes
evidence to show that the alleged crime at trial is so similar to those past occurrences
as to render unlikely the defendant's contention that this occurrence was accidental
or natural. See MCCORMICK § 190, at 450 & n.42. The majority was satisfied that the
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past occurrences were similar enough to fit the no-accident "exception," and their
conclusion was supported by precedent from similar cases. See Regina v. Roden, 12
Cox Crim. Cas. 630 (1874), cited in State v. LaPage, 57 N.H. 245, 294 (1876). See also
Regina v. Cotton, 12 Cox Crim. Cas. 400 (1873).
The signature "exception" isolates an unusual and distinctive factor in each of the
defendant's past crimes to establish that the alleged crime at trial, in which that factor
was also present, bore the "handiwork" of the defendant. See McCoRMICK § 190, at
449 & nn.36-37. The majority considered the repeated incidents of children choking
and turning blue while in the defendant's care were distinctive enough to warrant an
application of the signature "exception."
Judge Widener suggested, however, that the majority had not rested its decision
of admissibility on any particular "exception." 484 F.2d at 141 n.5. It may be that the
majority attempted to substitute the balancing test for the exceptions:
While we conclude that the evidence was admissible generally under
the accident and signature exceptions, we prefer to place our decision
upon a broader ground. Simply fitting evidence of this nature into an
exception heretofore recognized is, to our minds, too mechanistic an
approach.
Id. at 134. If the majority did substitute the balancing test for the exceptions, that
would explain the majority's reference to "relevance" in the summation of their bal-
ancing:
Indeed, the evidence is so persuasive and so necessary in case of infan-
ticide or other child abuse by suffocation if the wrongdoer is to be
apprehended, that we think that its relevance clearly outweighs its
prejudicial effect on the jury.
Id. at 135 (emphasis added). The balancing test is not a test of relevance; that is the
function of the "exceptions." The balancing test only provides a further safeguard
against the prejudicial effect of other-crimes evidence which, by the use of an "excep-
tion," has already been shown to be relevant to something other than the defendant's
bad character. However, since the majority did find the evidence admissible through
the accident and signature "exceptions," the error was not crucial.
Having mentioned the accident and signature "exceptions," however, the majority
seemed more concerned with another ground of relevance-using the prior-crimes evi-
dence to show the probability that Paul had been murdered:
Only when all of the evidence concerning the nine [sic] other
children and Paul is considered collectively is the conclusion impelled
that the probability that some or all of the other deaths, cyanotic
seizures, and respiratory deficiencies were accidental or attributable
to natural causes was so remote, the truth must be that Paul and some
or all of the other children died at the hands of the defendant.
Id. at 133 (emphasis added). This language is similar to the "doctrine of chances"
which holds that repeated incidents of the same nature are unlikely to happen to a
single person by mere accident. See MCCORMICK § 196, at 466. Normally the doctrine
of chances is used only in civil suits; for example, a defendant in a suit for accidental
injury might show that the plaintiff has raised numerous similar claims against other
persons in the past. After so many similar "injuries," the probability seems very slight
that the plaintiff suffered the same "injury" again, thereby raising doubt about the
honesty or veracity of his claim in the present case. See McCORMICK §§ 196-200.
The majority seemed to be suggesting a similar approach in Woods. After such a
large number of suspicious deaths of infants in the defendant's care in the past, the
probability that yet another death, similar to all the others, was accidental or natural
was too small to be believed. Thus, the evidence concerning the eight other children
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the balancing test, the majority stressed that such evidence is "neces-
sary in case of infanticide or other child abuse by suffocation if the
wrongdoer is to be apprehended . . . ,,33 Further, it was impressed
by the "persuasiveness" of the evidence that a crime had been com-
mitted by the defendant . 3 To the majority, the combination of these
factors outweighed the prejudicial effect of the evidence and it there-
fore concluded that the evidence had been properly admitted at
trial.
3 5
Judge Widener disapproved of the majority's use of the no-
accident and signature "exceptions, '36 but his primary disagreement
with the majority was based on his contention that the prior-crimes
evidence was not sufficiently conclusive of the defendant's guilt in
those past instances to be admissible.3 7 Because he believed that none
of the prior-crimes evidence should have been admitted at trial,
Judge Widener concluded that the conviction should have been re-
versed.38
might be admitted to show the probability that Paul was murdered. This would be a
proper application of the evidence, because it was not being used to show the bad
character of the defendant. There is one problem with this approach, however:
The low probability that a series of similar [occurrences] will happen
to the same person does not, of itself, lower the probability that a
particular one occurred. If the doctrine of chances is appealed to, it
would illustrate the preceding sentence this way: The probability that
10 fair coins tossed at once produced 10 heads is only 1/1024, but that
probability is derived from, and does not lower at all, the probability
(of 1/2) that a particular one of the coins came up heads.
MCCORMICK § 196, at 467 n.4. For a thorough discussion of the use of probabilities in
trials, see Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1971). See also MCCORMICK § 204.
• '484 F.2d at 135.31Id.
Id.
3Id. at 139. Judge Widener did not explain his disagreement on this point, because
the majority had given "no reason for its holding." Id.
"TJudge Widener suggested that the evidence should be "plain, clear and conclu-
sive" of the defendant's guilt of the prior crimes. 484 F.2d at 144. Many jurisdictions
have used this or a similar standard of conclusiveness in judging the admissibility of
prior-crimes evidence. See MCCORMICK § 190, at 452 & n.52. However, in those juris-
dictions which, like the Fourth Circuit, use the balancing test to determine the admis-
sibility of the evidence, the balancing test itself includes, in part, a consideration of
the conclusiveness of the evidence. In such jurisdictions no further requirement, like
Judge Widener's "plain, clear and conclusive" standard, is needed. McCormick is in
accord: "some courts have used the formula that [thd' prior-crimes evidence] must
be 'clear and convincing.' And it -is believed that before the evidence is admitted at
all, this factor of the substantial or unconvincing quality of the proof should be weighed
in the balance." MCCORMICK § 190, at 452 (emphasis added).
-'484 F.2d at 145.
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The Fourth Circuit's internal disagreement was not limited to the
admissibility of the prior-crimes evidence generally; the court was
likewise unable to agree on the propriety of using such evidence spe-
cifically to prove the corpus delicti of murder, i.e., to prove that a
murder had in fact been committed. 9 The majority held that prior-
crimes evidence could be used to establish the corpus delicti in mur-
der cases.4 0 While not finding any precedent for such an application
of prior-crimes evidence,the majority drew support for its position
from a line of arson cases where evidence of prior acts had been used
to establish the corpus delicti.4 ' Judge Widener was unconvinced by
the majority's analogy to arson cases. Instead, he argued for a strict
interpretation of the rule of exclusion and its attendent "exceptions,"
and since he was unable to find any established "exception" allowing
the use of prior-crimes evidence to prove the corpus delicti, he argued
that the evidence was inadmissible for that purpose.2
Judge Widener's criticism of the majority was twofold: first, the
prior-crimes evidence was insufficiently conclusive and did not meet
the standards of admissibility and therefore should not have been
admitted at trial, and second, even if it had been admitted, the
evidence should not have been used to prove the corpus delicti. Of
these objections, the first is the most convincing. Judge Widener's
concern that the prior-crimes evidence was not sufficiently conclusive
of the defendant's past criminality goes to the heart of the majority's
application of the balancing test. Normally, in determining the ad-
missibility of evidence of prior crimes, a court should balance the
conclusiveness of the evidence of each alleged offense. If a court
deems that the prejudicial effect of evidence concerning any single
alleged crime outweighs the conclusiveness of the defendant's guilt
for that offense, the evidence relating to that offense should not be
admitted.
In Woods, however, the majority departed from the rule which
requires that the conclusiveness of the evidence of each prior crime
3'The corpus delicti, or the "body of the crime," generally requires proof that there
has been some kind of injury or loss (in this case death) and that the cause of the loss
was someone's criminal act (in this case homicide). VII WIGMORE § 2072, at 401-02.
See also Perkins, The Corpus Delicti of Murder, 48 VA. L. REv. 173 (1962). Proof of
the corpus delicti is required beyond a reasonable doubt to assure that the defendant
is not found guilty of a "crime" that was never committed.
1484 F.2d at 136.
"Id. at 135. A second argument by analogy which the majority used was the fact
that "a confession may be relied upon to prove the corpus delicit if there is other
corroborating evidence, short of independent proof of the corpus delicti, to prove the
reliability of the confession." Id. at 135-36.
"Id. at 142-44.
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outweigh its prejudicial effect, and adopted a more collective ap-
proach to admissibility:
[I]f the evidence with regard to each child is considered sepa-
rately, it is true that some of the incidents are less conclusive
than others; but we think that the incidents must be consid-
ered collectively, and when they are, an unmistakable pattern
emerges. That pattern overwhelmingly establishes defendant's
guilt.
13
Although it did not specifically identify the "pattern," the majority
was presumably referring to the frequency of breathing difficulties
among the children "under circumstances where only [the] defen-
dant could have been the precipitating factor."4
The majority's departure from an individual consideration of the
evidence of each alleged act of child abuse seems unjustified. Child
abuse is such an abhorrent crime that the admission of evidence
regarding any single prior occurrence would have been prejudicial. In
view of the strong interest against the admission of prejudicial evi-
dence,15 the court should have eliminated evidence that was inconclu-
sive of the defendant's guilt in any particular instance. In Woods,
several of the children who died while with the defendant were shown
likely to have died of natural causes-one of diptheria, one of malnu-
trition and two of pneumonia.", It may be that the evidence concern-
ing those children did not completely exonerate the defendant of
responsibility for their deaths. However, it did render unlikely any
contention that the defendant had caused the deaths, and the incon-
clusive quality of that evidence should have precluded its admission.
Moreover, it was not correct to admit inconclusive evidence of
each instance on the ground that it might form a conclusive pattern.
The existence or non-existence of a pattern is a conclusion that must
be drawn from a consideration of the evidence concerning each child.
If the jury was supposed to discern a pattern of child abuse it would
have had to consider some evidence which was less conclusive of the
defendant's guilt than it was prejudicial. This would have been in
direct violation of the rule against allowing the jury to consider such
evidence. In approving the admission of all the prior-crimes evidence,
the majority thus approved an increase rather than a decrease in the
possibility of prejudice against the defendant.
'"Id. at 135. See also id. at 133, quoted supra note 32.
"Id. at 134.
'"See notes 10-15 supra and accompanying text.
"John Wise, Charles Stewart, Carol Huston and Lillie Stewart, respectively. See
note 7 supra.
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The majority's "collective" approach to prior-crimes evidence
seems to expand improperly the admissibility of that kind of evi-
dence. This expansion, appearing in a case where the majority be-
lieved that "the truth must be that Paul and some or all of the other
children died at the hands of the defendant,"47 comes "perilously
close" to what Judge Widener called "a rule in the law of evidence
that the end may justify the means . ... -,
However, while Judge Widener correctly criticized the majority
for admitting inconclusive evidence, it is not clear that his restrictive
approach to the use of prior-crimes evidence to prove the corpus
delicti would necessarily provide a greater guarantee of fairness and
justice. It was Judge Widener's view that because there was no estab-
lished "exception" which would allow admission of prior-crimes evi-
dence to prove the corpus delicti, the evidence should therefore not
have been admitted for that purpose." However, the traditional "ex-
ceptions" are not the exclusive grounds of relevancy, and the absence
of such an established "exception" should not be determinative of the
admissibility of prior-crimes evidence to prove the corpus delicti.0
The only requirements should be first, that the prior-crimes evidence
be shown logically probative of the corpus delicti, and second, that
the corpus delicti be an issue independent of the defendant's bad
character.5 ' If the evidence then passed the balancing test, it should
11484 F.2d at 133.
"Id. at 141 n.5.
1Id. at 144. His authority, by analogy to arson cases, was Kahn v. State, 182 Ind.
1, 3, 105 N.E. 385, 386 (1914):
Other crimes than the one for which the defendant is upon trial
are never permitted to be shown to prove the corpus deliciti. It is only
permissible in the trial of a criminal charge, in those cases where the
act constituting the crime under investigation has been clearly
established and the motive, intent or guilty knowledge of the defen-
dant is an issue.
484 F.2d at 144 n.12. Motive, intent and guilty knowledge were apparently the only
three "exceptions" under which prior-crimes evidence could be admitted in Indiana.
10See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
"See note 21 supra. See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 311 (1942), which
provides in pertinent part:
[Elvidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a
specified occasion is inadmissible as tending to prove that he commit-
ted a crime or civil wrong on another occasion if, but only if, the
evidence is relevant solely as tending to prove his disposition to com-
mit such a crime or civil wrong or to commit crimes or civil wrongs
generally.
The comment to rule 311 of the Model Code states:
A careful examination of the pertinent cases in England and in the
United States will reveal that the great majority of them reflect the
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be admitted. While it might have been an error for the majority to
admit evidence which did not meet the requirements of the balancing
test, it would have been no less an error to preclude the admission of
the evidence simply for lack of an established "corpus delicti excep-
tion." If the prior-crimes evidence was relevant to proving the corpus
delicti, and if the evidence passed the balancing test, its exclusion
would have unreasonably impeded the prosecution of a possible
wrongdoer.'
Ordinarily what impedes the prosecution of child abusers is not
the unwillingness of courts to recognize grounds for admissibility of
prior-crimes evidence, but a lack of sufficient evidence to convict due
to the private nature of the crime. In Woods, the majority recognized
this impediment, but its attempt to facilitate prosecutions for child
abuse so altered the balancing test as to increase severely the possi-
bility of a conviction based on prejudice.
A better way to ease prosecutorial frustration in child abuse cases
might be to allow the prosecution to use the evidence of a defendant's
prior offenses as proof that the defendant is a habitual child abuser
and therefore likely to have committed the crime for which he is on
trial. However, there are two problems with such an approach. The
first is that it allows prior-crimes evidence to be used to prove the
defendant's bad character, and therefore violates the standard rule
against such proof. ' Nevertheless, in trials for sex offenses, evidence
of a defendant's prior sex crimes is often admitted for the very pur-
pose of showing his propensity to commit acts like the one for which
he is charged.' By analogy to the sex crimes exception-the only true
"exception" to a rule which generally prohibits proof of bad charac-
ter' -it may be possible to establish the propriety of using evidence
of a defendant's previous involvement in child abuse to show his
disposition to commit that kind of crime.
The best reason given for the use of the sex-crime exception is that
such crimes are generally secret in nature and therefore difficult to
prove without some alteration of the strict policy against evidence of
doctrine expressed in this Rule. See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of
Similar Fact Evidence, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 954 (1933) England; 51 id.
988 (1939) America.
"'he majority had "no doubt about the relevance of the proof" to establish the
corpus delicti. 484 F.2d at 133. The evidence was also held to have passed the balancing
test, for reasons discussed and criticized in the text above.
"See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
"See generally Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior, 6 ARIz. L. Rv. 212
(1965). See also MCCORMICK § 190, at 446-50 & nn.38-41.
See note 21 supra.
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bad character." Likewise, child abuse is a secret crime, so the ration-
ale which supports the widespread use of the sex-crime exception
may justify the use of a similar exception in child abuse cases.
A second objection to the use of a defendant's prior offenses to
show his propensity to commit such acts is that this use of prior-
crimes evidence would not seem to protect the defendant from preju-
dice any more than the majority did in Woods. The majority ap-
proved the admission of evidence which was more prejudicial than
conclusive of the defendant's past guilt; a child-abuse exception
would admit evidence to prove a criminal propensity, which consti-
tutes the primary source of prejudice. The reason why the latter is
preferable is that under a child-abuse exception, it would still be
required that the probative value of the prior-crimes evidence out-
weigh its prejudicial effect, a standard which the majority abandoned
in Woods. Normally, when prior-crimes evidence is introduced it has
two effects: it supports the proposition it is introduced to prove and
it establishes that the defendant has a criminal history and, there-
fore, a probable criminal disposition. 7 The balancing test is then
applied to minimize the chance that the jury will be prejudiced by
the revelation of the latter. But the admission in Woods of evidence
concerning crimes the defendant probably did not commit actually
increased the possibility of prejudice. A child-abuse exception would
facilitate the prosecution of child abusers, because this exception
would relieve prosecutors from having to grope for, and perhaps fail-
ing to find, a proposition to which the prior-crimes evidence would
"Note, Admissibility of Other Offenses Evidence in Abnormal Sex Crimes, 39
CALIF. L. REV. 584, 587 (1951); Note, Prior Sexual Offenses Against a Person Other
Than the Prosecutrix, 46 TUL. L. REV. 336, 341 (1971). The poorest justification for the
use of the sex-crime exception is that sex offenders have a presumed psychological
disposition to repeat their crimes. See Gregg, supra note 54, at 231-34; Trautman,
Logical or Legal Relevancy, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 406 (1952). The belief that sex
offenders tend generally to be recidivists seems unsupported by empirical data. See
Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REV. 325, 334 (1956); Note,
Prior Sexual Offenses Against a Person Other Than the Prosecutrix, 46 TuL. L. REV.
336, 342 (1971); Other Crimes Evidence, supra note 10, at 764 n.7.
The existence of a general recidivist tendency among child abusers remains uncer-
tain. See D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 113-14 (1970):
IT[he following findings on repeated involvement in abuse incidents
of parents .. .had a high rate of "unknown" responses, but it is
known that at least 14.1 percent of mothers and 7.0 percent of fathers
had been victims of abuse in their childhood, and at least 31.6 percent
of mothers and 39.9 percent of fathers had been perpetrators of abuse
in the past.
5'United States v. Baldivid, 465 F.2d 1277, 1283 (4th Cir. 1972) (Sobeloff, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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be relevant.", On the other hand, it would preserve intact the balanc-
ing test, so that the defendant would suffer only a minimum of preju-
dice from the revelation of his criminal past-a revelation that is
inevitable whatever the basis of relevancy.
Whether or not courts adopt the proposed child abuse exception,
they must nevertheless recognize their continuing obligation to mini-
mize the danger of prejudice. The best way to do this is not to admit
any evidence of the defendant's criminal past. Even when the prose-
cution needs such evidence to prove its case, as in Woods, courts
should not automatically grant a blanket admission of all available
prior-crimes evidence. First, courts should search for alternatives to
prior-crimes evidence. One alternative which has been recently pro-
posed " would be the reliance upon expert testimony by a psychiatrist
or psychologist to establish whether the defendant has a propensity
to abuse children. Such evidence would seem to carry probative
weight equal to that of evidence of prior crimes, it might be more
reliable in establishing the existence or non-existence of such a dispo-
sition than prior-crimes evidence, and it would probably be less infla-
matory. Lacking alternatives to prior-crimes evidence, courts should
focus on the prosecution's need for the evidence and accordingly limit
the amount of such evidence they admit. For example, where the
defendant can be shown to have abused several children in the past,
but where there is clear evidence that he repeatedly maltreated the
one child for whose abuse he is on trial, the court should limit admis-
sion to the evidence of the crimes committed against that particular
child. This approach should reduce the danger of prejudice against
the defendant by reducing the amount of prior-crimes evidence
against him,6" without seriously impairing the prosecution's case.'
"'Woods itself provides an example of a court groping for such a proposition; it was
not without difficulty that the majority determined that the prior-crimes evidence was
admissible under the no-accident and signature "exceptions." See 484 F.2d at 134.
"In State v. Loss, - Minn. -, 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973), the court permitted
the jury to infer, from expert testimony on the "battering parent syndrome," that the
defendant fit one of the psychological latterns of a battering parent.
"This reasoning is used by courts which limit the admissibility of an alleged sex-
offender's prior sex crimes to those which he committed against the particular victim.
See note 21 supra.
"It is not suggested that courts rely solely on the use of instructions to the jury to
check the prejudicial effect of other-crimes evidence. "The naive assumption that
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,
453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). The authorities are in agreement with Justice
Jackson. See McCoRMICK § 43, at 89 & § 53, at 121; III WIGMORE § 988. See also Other
Crimes Evidence, supra note 10, at 765.
